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COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF SATISFIABILITY IN
PROBABILITY LOGIC
RUTGER KUYPER
Abstract. We consider the complexity of satisfiability in ε-logic, a probability
logic. We show that for the relational fragment this problem is Σ11-complete
for rational ε ∈ (0, 1), answering a question by Terwijn. In contrast, we show
that satisfiability in 0-logic is decidable. The methods we employ to prove
this fact also allow us to show that 0-logic is compact, while it was previously
shown that ε-logic is not compact for ε ∈ (0, 1).
1. Introduction
Many people have tried to combine logic with probability, which leads to so-
called probability logics. In this paper we will study the computational aspects of
one specific probability logic, introduced by Terwijn in [11]. This probability logic
is called ε-logic, because it depends on a fixed error parameter ε. There are two
important aspects of ε-logic which set it apart from other probability logics: first,
the logic is closely related to and motivated by probabilistic induction and Valiant’s
pac-model from computational learning theory, and second, instead of using an
entirely new syntax we use the same syntax as classical first-order language and
only change its interpretation.
Terwijn was not the first to introduce a logic motivated by Valiant’s pac-model.
In fact, Valiant himself also introduced a probability logic related to his pac-model
in [13]. However, as discussed in Kuyper and Terwijn [8] there are major differences
between Valiant’s logic and ε-logic: two of the most important ones being that
Valiant only studies finite models, and that his syntax captures only a fragment of
first-order logic. A logic which is actually more closely related to ε-logic is Keisler’s
logic LωP , surveyed in Keisler [6]. Instead of the classical quantifiers, this logic has
quantifiers of the form (Px ≥ r) which should be read as “holds for at least measure
r many x”. While this logic does not attempt to model probabilistic induction, and
does not contain the classical universal and existential quantifiers, it turns out we
can adapt some of the ideas used to prove results about LωP to obtain similar
results for ε-logic. In particular, in this paper we use some ideas from Hoover [4]
in which he proves that validity for LωP is Π11-complete. For more connections to
other probability logics, we refer to the introduction of [8].
Unfortunately, it turns out that ε-logic is computationally quite hard. Previously,
Terwijn [12] has shown that the set of ε-tautologies is undecidable, and in Kuyper [7]
it was shown that this set is in fact even Π11-hard. So, ε-validity is computationally
much harder than validity in first-order logic, and therefore we cannot hope to find
an effective calculus for it.
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In this paper, we will study the fragment of ε-logic not containing equality or
function symbols, i.e. containing only relation and constant symbols. For this
fragment, we will show that ε-satisfiability is, in general, Σ11-complete, refuting
a conjecture by Terwijn [12, Conjecture 5.3]. At first one might think that the
Σ11-hardness of ε-satisfiability already follows from the Π
1
1-hardness of ε-validity
mentioned above: indeed, in the classical case a formula ϕ is satisfiable if and only
if its negation ¬ϕ is not valid. However, because our logic is paraconsistent (i.e.
both a formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ can hold at the same time) this complement-
arity does not hold for ε-satisfiability and ε-validity. Therefore, we need to consider
the complexity of these two problems separately.
For ε = 0 the results are vastly different: 0-validity coincides with classical
validity, as shown in Terwijn [12], so it is Σ01-complete. In this paper we show that 0-
satisfiability is decidable, so 0-satisfiability is even easier than classical satisfiability.
This also clearly shows that the complexities of 0-validity and 0-satisfiability are
not complementary, as argued above. The different complexities for ε-satisfiability
and ε-validity are summarised in Table 1 below. Note that the exact complexity
of ε-validity is still open, as there is no known matching upper bound for the Π11-
hardness.
Table 1. Complexity of validity and satisfiability in ε-logic.





The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we will briefly recall the
definition of ε-logic and some facts proven in earlier papers. After that, in section
3 we show that a certain weak version of ε-satisfiability is Σ11. In section 4 we
briefly turn towards the problem of Skolemisation in ε-logic, which we will need for
the later results in this paper. After that, in section 5 we show that the relational
fragment of ε-satisfiability is Σ11. Next, in section 6 we turn to 0-satisfiability and we
show that this problem is, quite surprisingly, decidable. This contrasts our result in
section 7 that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard for rational ε ∈ (0, 1), which completes our
proof that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-complete for such ε. Finally, in section 8 we use the
results from section 6 to show that 0-logic is compact, contrasting an earlier result
by Kuyper and Terwijn [8, Theorem 8.2] that ε-logic is not compact for rational
ε ∈ (0, 1).
Our notation is mostly standard. We let ω denote the set of natural numbers.
We denote by λ the Lebesgue measure on the unit interval [0, 1]. By a relational
formula we mean a formula which only contains relation symbols and does not
contain equality, function or constant symbols. Throughout the paper, D denotes
a probability measure, or synonymously a probability distribution. When we say
that some property holds for D-almost all x, we mean that the set of x for which
the property holds has D-measure 1; when D is clear from the context we will omit
it. For all formulas ϕ and ψ, the formula ϕ ↔ ψ is short for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
For any measure D and any n ∈ ω, we let Dn denote the product measure of n
copies of D, and we let Dω denote the product measure of countable infinitely many
copies of D. For functions f, g ∈ ωω we denote by f ⊕ g the function defined by
f ⊕ g(2n) = f(n) and f ⊕ g(2n+ 1) = g(n).
For unexplained notions from measure theory, we refer to Bogachev [2], for de-
scriptive set theory, we refer to Kechris [5], for model theory, we refer to Chang
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and Keisler [3], and finally, for unexplained notions from computability theory we
refer to Odifreddi [9].
2. ε-logic
As we have mentioned above, ε-logic was introduced in Terwijn [11]. Over time,
the definition has evolved into its current form, which was first given in Kuyper
and Terwijn [8] and slightly differs from the original definition.
Definition 2.1. Let L be a first-order language, possibly containing the equality
symbol, of a countable signature. Let ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a first-order formula
in the language L , and let ε ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, let M be a classical first-order
model for M and let D be a probability measure on M . Then we inductively
define the notion of ε-truth, denoted by (M ,D) |=ε ϕ, as follows (where we leave
the parameters implicit).
(i) For every atomic formula ϕ:
(M ,D) |=ε ϕ if M |= ϕ.
(ii) We treat the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ classically, e.g.
(M ,D) |=ε ϕ ∧ ψ if (M ,D) |=ε ϕ and (M ,D) |=ε ψ.
(iii) The existential quantifier is treated classically as well:
(M ,D) |=ε ∃xϕ(x)
if there exists an a ∈M such that (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a).
(iv) The case of negation is split into sub-cases as follows:
(a) For ϕ atomic, (M ,D) |=ε ¬ϕ if (M ,D) 6|=ε ϕ.
(b) ¬ distributes in the classical way over ∧ and ∨, e.g.
(M ,D) |=ε ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) if (M ,D) |=ε ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ.
(c) (M ,D) |=ε ¬¬ϕ if (M ,D) |=ε ϕ.
(d) (M ,D) |=ε ¬(ϕ→ ψ) if (M ,D) |=ε ϕ ∧ ¬ψ.
(e) (M ,D) |=ε ¬∃xϕ(x) if (M ,D) |=ε ∀x¬ϕ(x).
(f) (M ,D) |=ε ¬∀xϕ(x) if (M ,D) |=ε ∃x¬ϕ(x).
(v) (M ,D) |=ε ϕ→ ψ if (M ,D) |=ε ¬ϕ ∨ ψ.




a ∈M | (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a)
] ≥ 1− ε.
So, the most important change is that we do not treat the universal quantifier
classically: instead of saying that we have (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a) for all elements a ∈M ,
we merely say that it holds for “many” of the elements, where “many” depends on
the error parameter ε.
The main reason for this change is that we want our logic to be learnable, in
the sense defined in Terwijn [11] (whose definition of learning is closely related to
Valiant’s pac-model). Roughly speaking, learnable means that there is an algorithm
which, given access to an oracle able to take samples from M , on input ϕ outputs
either ϕ or ¬ϕ with the output being correct (i.e. its output holds in the model
M ). Since the algorithm has to run in finite time, it can of course only take finitely
many samples. We do not want to add the classical universal quantifier to our
logic, since it is impossible to decide if a universal quantifier holds from just a finite
amount of information. Therefore we take special care in defining our negation: we
do not want (M ,D) |=ε ¬∃xϕ(x) to mean (M ,D) 6|=ε ∃xϕ(x), because the latter
is equivalent to saying that (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(x) holds classically for all x ∈M , which
is exactly what we wanted to avoid. We define our negation in such a way that it
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still behaves in a classical way on the propositional level, while it interchanges the
existential and universal quantifiers.
One other important point is that both (M ,D) |=ε ∀xϕ(x) and (M ,D) |=ε
∃x¬ϕ(x) may hold simultaneously, i.e. both a formula and its negation might hold
at the same time. Thus, ε-logic is paraconsistent. For our current work this has
one important implication: it is no longer the case that ϕ is satisfiable if and
only if its negation ¬ϕ is not a tautology, as demonstrated in Example 2.5 below.
Therefore, it is not clear a priori whether the complexity of these two problems are
complementary to each other, and we need to study them separately.
To make sure that all necessary sets are measurable, we need to restrict ourselves
to the right class of models.
Definition 2.2. Let L be a first-order language of a countable signature, possibly
containing the equality symbol, and let ε ∈ [0, 1]. Then an ε-model (M ,D) for the
language L consists of a classical first-order L-model M together with a probability
distribution D over M such that:
(1) For all formulas ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and all a1, . . . , an−1 ∈M , the set
{an ∈M | (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)}
is D-measurable (i.e. all definable sets of dimension 1 are measurable).
(2) All relations of arity n are Dn-measurable (including equality, if it is in
L) and all functions of arity n are measurable as functions from (M n,Dn)
to (M ,D) (where Dn denotes the n-fold product measure). In particular,
constants are D-measurable.
A probability model is a pair (M ,D) that is an ε-model for every ε ∈ [0, 1].
We note that (2) does not imply (1): the existential quantifier corresponds to
taking a projection, and it is well-known that the projection of a measurable set
need not be measurable. Nevertheless, the following result holds.
Proposition 2.3. Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a universal formula and let (M ,D) be an
ε-model. Then
{(a1, . . . , an) ∈M n | (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)}
is Dn-measurable.
Proof. First, one can use induction to prove that the lemma holds for propositional
formulas ψ; the base case is exactly (2). Next, let ϕ be a universal formula. By
Proposition 2.8 below we may assume ϕ to be in prenex normal form; say ϕ =
∀y1 . . . ∀ymψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym). We have just argued that the set
{(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm) ∈M n+m | (M ,D) |=ε ψ(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm)}
is Dn+m-measurable. The result now follows from repeatedly applying the fact that
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m and any Dn+m−i+1-measurable set X the function
(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm−i) 7→ Pr
D
[
bm−i+1 ∈M | (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm−i+1) ∈ X
]
is a Dn+m−i-measurable function, see e.g. Bogachev [2, Theorem 3.4.1]. 
In this paper, we will mostly be looking at languages not containing equality or
function symbols. Functions and equality turn out to give major problems when
trying to prove any results, mostly because they are not very compatible with
measure-theoretic relations. For example, if f is an n-ary D-measurable function
and A is a Dn+1-measurable set such that PrDn+1
[
graph(f)4A] = 0, then A does
not need to be the graph of a function even though we cannot distinguish it from
the graph of f using only the measure D. We will not impose any restrictions
COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF SATISFIABILITY IN PROBABILITY LOGIC 5
on our language beforehand, but will instead mention in each theorem to which
languages it applies.
Definition 2.4. A formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is ε-satisfiable if there exists an ε-model
(M ,D) and there exist a1, . . . , an ∈ M such that (M ,D) |=ε ϕ. Similarly, we say
that ϕ is an ε-tautology or is ε-valid (notation: |=ε ϕ) if for all probability models
(M ,D) and all a1, . . . , an ∈M it holds that (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
Example 2.5. Let Q be a unary predicate. Then ϕ = ∀xQ(x) ∨ ∀x¬Q(x) is a
1
2 -tautology. Namely, in every probability model, either the set on which Q holds or
its complement has measure at least 12 . However, ϕ is not an ε-tautology for ε <
1
2 .
Furthermore, both ϕ and ¬ϕ are classically satisfiable and hence ε-satisfiable for
every ε; in particular we see that ϕ can be an ε-tautology while simultaneously ¬ϕ
is ε-satisfiable.
One might wonder why for satisfiability we only require ε-models, while for
validity we look at the slightly stronger and less elegant probability models. To
explain this, we will need the next theorem and proposition, which will both be
used a lot throughout the paper.
Theorem 2.6. (Kuyper and Terwijn [8, Theorem 5.8]) Let L be a countable first-
order language not containing equality or function symbols. Let Γ be an ε-satisfiable
set of sentences. Then there exists an ε-model on [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure
which ε-satisfies Γ. Furthermore, all relations in the new ε-model can be chosen to
be Borel.
Proposition 2.7. ([8, Proposition 5.1]) Let M be a first-order model that is a
Polish space, and let D0 be a Borel probability measure on M such that all rela-
tions and functions are Dn0 -measurable. Then all definable sets are analytic. In
particular, if we let D be the completion of D0, then (M ,D) is a probability model.
Now, if ϕ is any formula not containing function symbols which is ε-satisfiable
in the sense that it has an ε-model, then Theorem 2.6 tells us that it has a model
with Borel relations. We then know from Proposition 2.7 that this model is in fact
a probability model. Thus: even though we did not require an ε-satisfiable formula
to have a probability model, we get this model for free. Unfortunately we do not
know of a similar result for ε-validity. For our results on validity in Kuyper [7]
we really need probability models, hence the disparity between the definitions of
ε-validity and ε-satisfiability.
The next result will also be used a lot.
Proposition 2.8. (Terwijn [11]) Every formula ϕ is semantically equivalent to a
formula ϕ′ in prenex normal form; i.e. (M ,D) |=ε ϕ ⇔ (M ,D) |=ε ϕ′ for all
ε ∈ [0, 1] and all ε-models (M ,D).
We recall some more definitions from [8].
Definition 2.9. We will call a measure ν on a σ-algebra B of subsets of N a
submeasure of a measure µ on a σ-algebra A of subsets of some set M ⊇ N if for
every B ∈ B there exists an AB ∈ A such that B = AB ∩N and µ(AB) = ν(B).
Definition 2.10. An ε-submodel of an ε-model (M ,D) is an ε-model (N ,E) over
the same language such that:
• N is a submodel of M in the classical sense,
• E is a submeasure of D.
We will denote this by (N ,E) ⊂ε (M ,D).
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Definition 2.11. An elementary ε-submodel of an ε-model (M ,D) is an ε-submo-
del (N ,E) such that, for all formulas ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) and sequences a1, . . . , an ∈
N we have:
(N ,E) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)⇔ (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
We will denote this by (N ,E) ≺ε (M ,D).
Finally, we wish to mention the following result on reductions between different
ε.
Theorem 2.12. (Kuyper and Terwijn [8, Theorem 7.1]) Let L be a countable first-
order language not containing equality or function symbols. Then, for all rationals
0 ≤ ε0 ≤ ε1 < 1, ε0-satisfiability many-one reduces to ε1-satisfiability.
Theorem 2.13. ([8, Theorem 7.4]) Let L be a countable first-order language not
containing equality or function symbols. Then, for all rationals 0 < ε1 ≤ ε0 ≤ 1,
ε0-satisfiability many-one reduces to ε1-satisfiability.
Remark 2.14. As discussed in [8], we can perform these reductions per quan-
tifier: that is, we do not need to apply the reduction to the entire formula, but
can apply it on a per-quantifier basis. For example, if we let f0 be the reduction
from 0-satisfiability to 12 -satisfiability and f 14 the reduction from 1-satisfiability to
1
2 -satisfiability, then for all formulas ϕ0, ϕ 12 , ϕ
1
4
the expression “there exists a prob-











) ∧ ϕ 1
2
is 12 -satisfiable”.
We note that 1-logic is fairly trivial: every formula in prenex normal form con-
taining a universal quantifier is trivially true, so the only interesting fragment is
the existential fragment, which is just the classical fragment. This paper will deal
with the other two interesting cases: rational ε ∈ (0, 1) in section 3, 5 and 7, and
ε = 0 in section 6 and 8.
3. Towards an upper bound for ε-satisfiability
Our first goal is to show that (the relational fragment of) ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Together with the proof in section 7 that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard for rational
ε ∈ (0, 1) this will show that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-complete. There are multiple
ways one could go about proving this. The first would be to reduce ε-satisfiability
to Keisler’s logic LωP . In Hoover [4], it is shown that validity for this logic is
Π11-complete, hence satisfiability for LωP (which is dual to validity in the same
way as for classical logic) is Σ11-complete. Keisler proves this through the use of a
deduction system with infinitary deduction rules.
We will take a different, more direct approach. We will prove that there is a
natural, equivalent formulation of ε-satisfiability of which we can directly see that it
is Σ11. This equivalent formulation is the hidden heart of the completeness proof for
LωP , and our method allows one to grasp the true essence of the proof. Of course,
this comes at the price of not having a deduction system, but it is questionable
how useful a deduction system with infinitary deduction rules is in the first place.
Furthermore, because of the reduction to Keisler’s logic, this deduction system
would talk about formulas containing Keisler’s quantifiers (Px ≥ r). So, we would
lose the advantage of using only the language of first-order logic. We will briefly
come back to this point in Remark 3.7 and Remark 5.6.
As a first step, we will show that a certain weaker form of ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Definition 3.1. A weak ε-model is a pair (M ,D) which satisfies the conditions of
Definition 2.2, except possibly for condition (2).
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A finitely additive model is a pair (M ,D) consisting of a first-order model M
and a finitely additive measure D over M .
We say that ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is weakly ε-satisfiable (respectively finite additively
ε-satisfiable) if there exist a weak ε-model (respectively finitely additive model)
(M ,D) and a1, . . . , an ∈M such that (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).1
For finitely additive models, the following result by Tarski turns out to be useful.
Theorem 3.2. (Tarski) Every finitely additive measure D on a set X can be ex-
tended to a finitely additive measure D ′ on the power set P(X).
Proof. See Birkhoff [1, p. 185]. 
This result also explains why we did not impose any measurability conditions on
our finitely additive models: if ϕ is satisfied in some finitely additive model (M ,D),
then it is also satisfied in the model (M ,D ′) in which every set is measurable.
At first sight, finitely additive ε-satisfiability might seem to be much weaker than
weak ε-satisfiability. Surprisingly, it turns out that they are equivalent.
Theorem 3.3. A formula ϕ is weakly ε-satisfiable if and only if it is finite additively
ε-satisfiable.
Proof. Clearly any weak ε-model is also a finitely additive model, so if ϕ is weakly
ε-satisfiable it is certainly finite additively ε-satisfiable.
For the converse, assume (M ,D) is a finitely additive model ε-satisfying ϕ.
Extend D to a finitely additive measure D ′ on P(X) using Theorem 3.2 and take
an ultrapower (N ,E) of (M ,D ′) (as defined in Kuyper and Terwijn [8, Definition
8.8]). Then (N ,E) is a weak ε-model by [8, Corollary 8.10] and it ε-satisfies ϕ by
[8, Theorem 8.9]. 
In [8, Example 4.5] it was shown that, in general, not every ε-satisfiable sentence
has a countable ε-model (i.e. the Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem does not
hold in the usual sense). In contrast, this does hold if we look at finitely additive
models.
Definition 3.4. Let D be a probability measure. We say that D is countable if
the Boolean algebra on which D is defined is countable.
Theorem 3.5. (Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem for finitely additive ε-
satisfiability) Let L be a countable first-order language. Let (M ,D) be a finitely
additive model and let X ⊆ M be countable. Then there exists a finitely additive
model
(N ,E) ≺ε (M ,D)
such that X ⊆ N and such that N and E are countable.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, we may without loss of generality assume that the domain
of D is P(M ). We will define a sequence X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆ . . . of countable subsets of
M and let N be the restriction of M to
⋃
n∈ωXn.
Let X0 consist of X together with the interpretation c
M of all constants. Next,
given Xn, we show how to define Xn+1. Let Bn+1 be the Boolean algebra generated
1Because we did not impose any measurability conditions on our finitely additive model, it
could be the case that the set occurring in case (vi) of Definition 2.1 is not measurable. For





a ∈ M | (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a)
] ≥ 1− ε,
i.e. we let a universal quantifier be false if the corresponding set is not measurable.
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by the ε-definable subsets of (M ,D) using parameters from Xn. Since Xn is count-
able, Bn+1 will also be countable. Fix an element xB ∈ B for every non-empty
B ∈ Bn+1. Now let
Xn+1 =Xn ∪ {xB | B ∈ Bn+1}∪
{fM (a1, . . . , am) | f ∈ L , f is m-ary and a1, . . . , am ∈ Xn}.
Then Xn+1 is countable and Xn ⊆ Xn+1 ⊆M .
As announced above, we let N be M 
⋃
n∈ωXn. Note that if a1, . . . , am ∈ N ,
then there is some n ∈ ω such that a1, . . . , am ∈ Xn. Then fM (a1, . . . , am) ∈
Xn+1 ⊆ N so the functions on N are well-defined.
For every B which is in the Boolean algebra generated by the ε-definable subsets
of (M ,D) using parameters from N , let E(B ∩ N ) = D(B). Note that such a
B uses only finitely parameters and hence is already ε-definable using parameters
from some Xn. We show that the finitely additive measure E is well-defined. To
this end, assume that B1, B2 in the Boolean algebra described above are such that
B1 ∩N = B2 ∩N . Let Xn be such that B1, B2 can be ε-defined using parameters
from Xn. If B1 6= B2, then either B1 ∩ (M \ B2) 6= ∅ or (M \ B1) ∩ B2 6= ∅. In
both cases, one of these points gets added to Xn+1, hence B1 ∩ N 6= B2 ∩ N , a
contradiction. So, B1 = B2 and therefore D(B1) = D(B2), as desired.
It remains to show that (N ,E) is an elementary finitely additive ε-submodel of
(M ,D), i.e. that for all sequences a1, . . . , an ∈ N and for all formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
we have
(N ,E) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an)⇔ (M ,D) |=ε ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
We prove this using induction over the formulas in prenex normal form. For pro-
positional formulas, this is directly clear. For the existential case, note that
(N ,E) |=ε ∃xψ(x, a1, . . . , an)
clearly implies that this also holds in (M ,D). For the converse, assume
(M ,D) |=ε ∃xψ(x, a1, . . . , an).
Let Xm be such that a1, . . . , an ∈ Xm. By construction, we have added a point
from the non-empty set
{b ∈M | (M ,D) |=ε ψ(b, a1, . . . , an)}
to N . So, there exists some point b ∈ N such that (N ,E) |=ε ψ(b, a1, . . . , an).
Using the induction hypothesis, this directly implies that
(N ,E) |=ε ∃xψ(x, a1, . . . , an).
For the universal case, let ϕ = ∀xψ(x, x1, . . . , xn). Let
B = {x ∈M | (M ,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)},
C = {x ∈ N | (N ,E) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)}.
Then by induction hypothesis we have
C = {x ∈ N | (M ,D) |=ε ψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)}
= B ∩N .
From this we see that E(C) = D(B), and hence
(M ,D) |=ε ∀xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn)⇔ (N ,E) |=ε ∀xψ(x, b1, . . . , bn).
This concludes the induction. 
Theorem 3.6. Let L be a countable language and let ε be rational. Then weak
ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
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Proof. From Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.5 we see that a formula ϕ is weakly ε-
satisfiable if and only if it is ε-satisfied in a countable finitely additive model. We
sketch how to express the latter as a Σ11-formula. Namely, we can express this by
saying:
• there exist interpretations RM ⊆ ωn for the relations R and interpretations
for the constants (note that this can be done through one second-order
existential quantifiers, by using a pairing function);
• there exist Q ⊆ ω (representing the Boolean algebra) and D : ω → R;
such that:
• the sets Qn := {m ∈ ω | 〈n,m〉 ∈ Q} for n ∈ ω form a Boolean algebra;
• the function mapping Qn to D(n) is a finitely additive measure;
• ϕ is ε-satisfied in (M ,D).
It can be directly verified that all the items in the second list can be expressed as
arithmetical formulas. Combining this with the existential second-order quantifiers
from the first list, we obtain the desired result. 
Remark 3.7. In Keisler’s logic LωP , finitely additive models can be obtained
by taking a maximal consistent set of formulas in the calculus he calls weak LωP
(see Keisler [6, Definition 1.4.1 and Theorem 1.5.3]). By extending his logic with
rules for the existential quantifier, we would be able to obtain something similar:
note that ϕ = ∀x1∃x2 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) is ε-satisfiable if and only if (Px1 ≥
1 − ε)∃x2 . . . (Pxn ≥ 1 − ε)ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is satisfiable. In fact, we can base our
system on the finitary fragment of weak LωP (i.e. we only need Keisler’s axioms
A1-A5) since our formulas correspond to formulas in Keisler’s positive fragment.
From this we find that weak ε-satisfiability is in fact even Π01. Since we are not
interested in weak ε-satisfiability and merely see it as a stepping stone for our
results on (regular) ε-satisfiability, which we have already shown to be Σ11-hard, we
will not pursue this matter any further.
Our next goal is to extend Theorem 3.6 to regular ε-satisfiability, instead of just
weak ε-satisfiability. Before we do so, we will first look at some results concerning
Skolemisation in ε-logic.
4. Skolemisation in ε-logic
For classical satisfiability, we can eliminate existential quantifiers by introducing
Skolem functions. Clearly, we can also do something similar here: for example,
if a statement ∀x∃yϕ(x, y) is 0-true in some model (M ,D), we can extend M to
a model N such that (N ,D) |=0 ∀xϕ(x, f(x)) holds. We do not even need that
M |= ϕ(x, f(x)) holds for every x ∈ M for which M |= ∃yϕ(x, y) holds — it is
enough if this is true for almost all such x.
However, we have required our functions to be measurable. It is not directly
clear that we can also pick our Skolem functions in a measurable way. Our next
result shows that this is possible.
Theorem 4.1. Let ϕ be a formula not containing function symbols. Then ϕ is
ε-satisfiable if and only if its Skolemisation is ε-satisfiable.
Proof. We need to show that we can pick the Skolem functions in a measurable way.
First, assume ϕ does not contain the equality symbol. Now, if ϕ is ε-satisfiable,
then by Theorem 2.6 we may assume it is ε-satisfied in a model (M , λ) on [0, 1] with
the Lebesgue measure, with Borel relations. Then all definable sets are analytic by
Proposition 2.7.
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Let ϕ = ∀x1∃y1 . . . ∀xn∃ynψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) be in prenex normal form.
Now, we use recursion over 1 ≤ i ≤ n to define Borel measurable Skolem functions
f1, f2, . . . , fn, by performing the following steps:
(1) Use the Jankov and von Neumann Uniformisation Theorem (see e.g. Kechris
[5, Theorem 18.1]2) to find a Lebesgue-measurable uniformising function
gi: that is, for all x1, x2, . . . , xi ∈ [0, 1], if there exists an yi ∈ [0, 1] such
that
(M , λ) |=ε ∀xi+1 . . . ∃ynψ(x1, . . . , xn,
f1(x1), . . . , fi−1(x1, . . . , xi−1), yi, . . . , yn),
then we have, if we denote y = gi(x1, x2, . . . , xi):
(M , λ) |=ε ∀xi+1 . . . ∃ynψ(x1, . . . , xn,
f1(x1), . . . , fi−1(x1, . . . , xi−1), y, yi+1, . . . , yn).
(2) Let fi be a Borel function which is equal to gi almost everywhere; that such
functions exist is shown in Bogachev [2, Proposition 2.1.11], or can easily
be proven using Lusin’s Theorem on measurable functions (see e.g. Kechris
[5, Theorem 17.12]3).
In the case that ϕ does contain the equality symbol, we may assume it is satisfied
by a model on [0, r] plus atoms, see Kuyper and Terwijn [8, Theorem 5.9]. We can
apply the construction above on [0, r] and use AC to choose the values fi takes
in the atoms; since there are only countably many atoms, this does not alter the
measurability of the fi. 
It turns out we can do even more. We assumed that our formula ϕ did not contain
any function symbols, but now its Skolemisation does contain function symbols.
The next proposition shows that we can also construct a kind of Skolemisation
which does not need function symbols.
Theorem 4.2. Let L be a language not containing equality or function symbols (but
it may contain constant symbols). Then there exists a language L ′ only containing
relation symbols and a computable function mapping each formula ϕ in the language
L to a universal formula ϕ′ in the language L ′ such that for every ε ∈ [0, 1]: ϕ is
ε-satisfiable if and only if ϕ′ is ε-satisfiable.
Proof. The idea of the proof is roughly as follows: because universal quantifiers
only talk about measure, we can always change the interpretation of a relation on
a set of measure zero without affecting the truth of the universal quantifiers. Thus,
we can always add witnesses of measure zero, as long as there are no contradicting
statements about a witness. Let R be a relation symbol, say of arity k. To express
which statements hold about which witnesses, we add a new copy of R for every
atomic formula of the form R(t1, . . . , tk) up to a permutation of the universally
bound variables. We then form the formula ϕ′ by replacing the atomic formula by
this new copy of R. If ϕ is satisfiable, then ϕ′ is satisfiable just by interpreting
the new relation symbol by the interpretation of R(t1, . . . , tk). Conversely, if ϕ
′ is
satisfiable, we pick our witnesses in a set of measure zero (say, the Cantor set) and
recombine all the relations into one relation R. We will now give the proof in full
detail.
2Kechris only states that we get a partial function with as domain exactly the (analytic) set of
those x1, . . . , xi for which an yi as above exists, but we can easily extend this to a total Lebesgue
measurable function by letting its value be 0 outside this set.
3Kechris only states this theorem for Borel measures, but it holds for the Lebesgue measure
with exactly the same proof.
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Let R be a relation symbol, say of arity k. First, we enlarge our language by
adding a copy of R for every atomic formula of the form R(t1, . . . , tk), up to a
permutation of the universally bound variables. To this end, fix an enumeration
c0, c1, . . . of the constant symbols in L . Let AR be the set of functions from
{1, . . . , k} to {0} ∪ ({1, 2} × ω). To every atomic formula R(t1, . . . , tk) we assign
a function α ∈ AR by letting α(i) = 0 if ti equals some (universally bound) xj ,
by letting α(i) = (1, j) if ti equals (the existentially bound) yj and by letting
α(i) = (2, j) if ti equals the constant symbol cj . During the proof, we will say
that the α constructed in this way is the α corresponding to the atomic formula
R(t1, . . . , tk). Now, for every relation symbol R and every α ∈ AR, we introduce
a new relation symbol Rα, where the arity of Rα equals |{1 ≤ i ≤ k | α(i) =
0}|+ max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(α)}.
Let ϕ = ∀x1∃y1 . . . ∃yn∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) be a formula in L in prenex
normal form. We describe how to form ϕ′ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ′(x1, . . . , xn) from ϕ.
Let R(t1, . . . , tk) be an atomic formula occurring in ϕ and let α be the function
corresponding to this atomic formula, as described above. Let m = max{j ∈ ω |
(1, j) ∈ ran(α)} and let s1, . . . , sk′ be the subsequence of t1, . . . , tk consisting of just
those ti which equal a universally bound variable xj (during the proof, we will say
that s1, . . . , sk′ is the universal subsequence of t1, . . . , tk). Then we form ψ
′ from
ψ by replacing each R(t1, . . . , tk) with Rα(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm).
We show that ϕ′ is as desired. First, assume ϕ is ε-satisfiable. So, by Theorem
2.6 there exists an ε-model (M , λ) with the Lebesgue measure λ and Borel relations
ε-satisfying ϕ. By the previous proposition, for each yi we can find a Borel Skolem
function fi : [0, 1]
i → [0, 1]. Let R be a relation symbol and let α ∈ AR. We
interpret RNα (s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm) as R
M (v1, . . . , vk), where
vi :=

sj if α(i) = 0 and |{s ≤ j | α(s) = 0}| = i
fj(x1, . . . , xj) if α(i) = (1, j)
cj if α(i) = (2, j).
We claim that RN is both analytic and co-analytic; then it is Borel by Souslin’s
theorem (see e.g. Kechris [5, Theorem 14.11]). Let β be the function such that
βi(s1, . . . , sk′ , y1, . . . , ym) :=

sj if α(i) = 0 and |{s ≤ j | α(s) = 0}| = i
yj if α(i) = (1, j)
cj if α(i) = (2, j),
i.e. β ‘restores’ the atomic formula R(t1, . . . , tk) in the sense that R(t1, . . . , tk) is
the same as R(β(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm)). Finally, let Bj be the graph of fj . Then
we have
RNα = {(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm) | ∃y1 . . . ym(β(s1, . . . , sk′ , y1, . . . , ym) ∈ RM∧
(x1, y1) ∈ B1 ∧ · · · ∧ (x1, . . . , xm, ym) ∈ Bm)}
so it is analytic, and
RNα = {(s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm) | ∀y1 . . . ym
((x1, y1) ∈ B1 ∧ · · · ∧ (x1, . . . , xm, ym) ∈ Bm)→ β(s1, . . . , sk′ , y1, . . . , ym) ∈ RM }
so it is also co-analytic. Therefore, (N , λ) is an ε-model by Proposition 2.7.
We know that
(M , λ) |=ε ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn, f1(x1), . . . , fn(x1, . . . , xn))
because the fi are Skolem functions. Let R(t1, . . . , tk) be an atomic formula with
corresponding α and let s1, . . . , sk′ be the universal subsequence of t1, . . . , tk. Let
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R(u1, . . . , uk) be the atomic formula where fi(x1, . . . , xi) is substituted for each yi.
Then
{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈M n | RM (u1, . . . , uk)}
= {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ N n | RNα (s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm)}(3)
by the definition of RNα . Then it follows using formula induction that
{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈M n |M |= ψ(x1, . . . , xm, f1(x1), . . . , fn(x1, . . . , xn))}
= {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ N n | N |= ψ′(x1, . . . , xm)},
where the only interesting case is the atomic case, which is exactly (3). So, we see
that also (N , λ) |=ε ϕ′ holds.
Conversely, assume we have a model (N , λ) with the Lebesgue measure and
Borel relations satisfying ϕ′. We now need to put all the RNα together into one R
M .
The basic idea is that, because universal quantifiers only talk about measure, we
can glue the relations together on a set of measure zero. We will pick all of our
witnesses inside Cantor space, which has measure 0 inside [0, 1]. To this end, let
ζ : C → ⋃1≤i≤n[0, 1]i be a Borel isomorphism of Cantor space (as subset of [0, 1])
with copies of unit boxes of increasing dimension (that such an isomorphism exists
follows from Kechris [5, Theorem 15.6]). Also fix an injective function η : ω ↪→
[0, 1] \ C, which we will use to interpret the constant symbols.
We construct a model M on [0, 1]. For any constant symbol ci, let cMi = η(i).
Next we show how to define RM of arity k. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ [0, 1]. Let β(i) = (1, j)
if ai ∈ C and ζ(ai) has length j, let β(i) = (2, j) if ai ∈ ran(η) and η−1(ai) = j and
finally let β(i) = 0 if neither of these cases hold. We say that this β corresponds to
the sequence a1, . . . , ak. Let b1, . . . , bk′ be the subsequence of a1, . . . , ak obtained
by taking just those ai satisfying β(i) = 0. Let m = max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(β)}
and let i be the least 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that β(j) = (1,m). Now let RM (a1, . . . , ak)
be defined as RNβ (b1, . . . , bk′ , ζ1(ai), . . . , ζm(ai)). We can prove that R
N is Borel
using Souslin’s theorem, in the same way as above.
Next, let R(t1, . . . , tk) be an atomic formula and let α correspond to this atomic
formula . Furthermore, let s1, . . . , sk′ be the universal subsequence of t1, . . . , tk.
Let m = max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(α)}. Let b1, . . . , bk ∈ [0, 1] \ (C ∪ ran(η)) and
consider the sequence ai = t
M
i [xj := bj , yj := ζ
−1(b1, . . . , bj)]. Then it is directly
verified that the β corresponding to the sequence a1, . . . , ak is equal to α. Thus, by
the definition of RN we see that
RM (t1, . . . , tk)[xi := bi, yi := ζ
−1(b1, . . . , bi)]
holds if and only if
RNα (s1, . . . , sk′ , x1, . . . , xm)[xi := bi]
holds. So, from the construction of ψ′ we see that
{~x ∈ ([0, 1] \ (C ∪ ran(η)))n |M |= ψ(x1, . . . , xn, ζ−1(x1), . . . , ζ−1(x1, . . . , xn))}
= {~x ∈ ([0, 1] \ (C ∪ ran(η)))n | N |= ψ′(x1, . . . , xn)}.
Because ran(η) is countable we know that C ∪ ran(η) has Lebesgue-measure 0, so
using the fact that ϕ′ holds in (N , λ) we then directly see that
(M , λ) |=ε ∀x1∀x2 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn, ζ−1(x1), . . . , ζ−1(x1, . . . , xn))
holds and therefore (M , λ) |=ε ϕ holds, as desired. 
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5. ε-satisfiability is Σ11
In the previous section we saw that every formula in a language not containing
equality or function symbols is equisatisfiable to a universal relational formula,
through a computable transformation. Therefore, in our proof of the Σ11 upper
bound for ε-satisfiability without equality or function symbols, we will only need
to consider the universal relational fragment.
In Section 3 we already showed that weak ε-satisfiability is Σ11. However, it is not
directly clear how to extend Theorem 3.6 to regular ε-satisfiability: the relations in
the ε-model we built there using an ultrapower will, in general, not be measurable.
Thus, if we want a result similar to Theorem 3.3 for ε-satisfiability, we will need to
impose extra conditions on our finitely additive models. Our extra conditions will
be motivated by the next lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let D be a probability measure on a set X and let R be a Dn-
measurable set. Then for every m ∈ ω there exists k ∈ ω and D-measurable sets Xi,j
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Proof. Fix an enumeration f1, . . . , fs of all functions from {1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , n}.
Let H(R) be the statement of the lemma, i.e. H(R) states that: for every m ∈ ω
there exists k ∈ ω and D-measurable sets Xi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that
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We show that the class of subsets R ⊆ Xn for which H(R) holds is a monotone
class containing all finite unions of boxes, from which then follows that H(R) holds
for all Dn-measurable sets R by the monotone class theorem (see e.g. Bogachev [2,
Theorem 1.9.3]).
Clearly, H(R) holds if R is a finite union of boxes. Next, let R =
⋂
j∈ω Rj with
R0 ⊇ R1 ⊇ . . . be a monotone decreasing sequence and assume that H(Rj) holds
for all these Rj . Fix m ∈ ω. By countable additivity we can determine, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ s an li ∈ ω such that
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Let l be the maximum of these li. By our hypotheses H(Rj) we can determine for
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Then A is of the desired form (i.e. it can be written as a finite union of Cartesian
products): by distributivity, A is equal to a finite union of expressions of the form
(X1u1,1 × · · · ×X1u1,k1) ∩ · · · ∩ (X lul,1 × · · · ×X lul,kl)
and this expression is equal to
(X1u1,1 ∩ · · · ∩X lul,1)× · · · × (X1u1,n ∩ · · · ∩X lul,n).















So, this shows that H(R) holds.
The case in which R is the union of a monotone increasing sequence can be
proven in a similar way, which completes the proof. 
Now, the important idea is that this property of ‘having finite approximations’
can be expressed in the language of ε-logic, and is hence preserved under taking
ultrapowers. Therefore, if we take an ultrapower as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, this
ultrapower will also possess these finite approximations. By taking a suitable limit
of a sequence approximating the relation R we will obtain a measurable relation S
that coincides with R almost everywhere. The next lemma expresses that such an
approximation is good enough for our purposes.
Lemma 5.2. Let (M ,D) be an ε-model and let R,S be two n-ary relation symbols
such that for every function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} we have:
(M ,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))↔ S(xf(1), . . . , xf(n))).
Then for every universal formula ϕ not containing function symbols or constant
symbols, if we let ϕ′ be the formula where every occurrence of R is replaced by S:
(M ,D) |=ε ϕ if and only if (M ,D) |=ε ϕ′.
Proof. First we prove using formula induction that for every propositional formula
ψ(x1, . . . , xm):
(M ,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ψ′(x1, . . . , xn)).
For atomic formulas this follows from our assumption: since our language does not
contain function or constant symbols, every atomic subformula of ϕ is of the form
R(y1, . . . , yn) where y1, . . . , yn ∈ {x1, . . . , xn}. Now let f be the function such that
yi = xf(i) and apply the hypothesis. The other cases in the formula induction are
direct.
Because of our definition of →, which is only classical on the propositional level,
we see that α ↔ β which is defined as (α → β) ∧ (β → α) is also only classical on
the propositional level. To ease our notation, for the rest of the proof we let ⇔ be
the connective expressing ε-equivalence, i.e. we define (M ,D) |=ε α ⇔ β if either
(M ,D) |=ε α ∧ β or (M ,D) 6|=ε α ∨ β. In particular ⇔ coincides with ↔ on the
propositional level, so we see that
(M ,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ψ(x1, . . . , xn)⇔ ψ′(x1, . . . , xn)).
Next, we note that universal quantifiers distribute over⇔ in 0-logic, i.e. we have
that (M ,D) |=0 ∀x(α(x)⇔ β(x)) if and only if (M ,D) |=0 (∀xα(x))⇔ (∀xβ(x)).
From this we see that for every propositional formula ψ we have
(M ,D) |=0 (∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn))⇔ (∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ′(x1, . . . , xn)),
i.e. for every universal formula ϕ we have that (M ,D) |=0 ϕ⇔ ϕ′. From this fact
the statement of the theorem directly follows. 
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Before we continue with the completeness proof, we note the following independ-
ently interesting corollary of the previous two lemmas.
Corollary 5.3. If a formula ϕ not containing equality, function and constant sym-
bols is ε-satisfiable, then it is also ε-satisfiable in a model on [0, 1] with the Lebesgue
measure where we can choose each relation to be either Π02 or Σ
0
2.
Proof. Let ϕ be ε-satisfiable; for now we assume that ϕ is a universal relational
formula. By Theorem 2.6 it is then also ε-satisfied in a model (M , λ) on [0, 1] with
the Lebesgue measure. For every relation R of arity n and every m ∈ ω use Lemma
5.1 to determine km ∈ ω and Lebesgue-measurable sets Xm,i,j such that for all
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For every such Xm,i,j , let Ym,i,j be a Σ
0
1 set such that Xm,i,j4Ym,i,j has Lebesgue-
measure 0 (see e.g. Kechris [5, Theorem 17.10]). Now let N be the model where






((Ym,1,1 × · · · × Ym,1,n) ∪ · · · ∪ (Ym,km,1 × · · · × Ym,km,n)).
Then PrDn
[
RN4RM ] = 0, see e.g. Bogachev [2, Theorem 1.12.6], so (M ,D) and
(N ,D) satisfy the same universal formulas by Lemma 5.2. Furthermore, the rela-
tions in N are clearly Π02.
In the general case, let ϕ be any formula and let ϕ′ be the universal relational
formula from Proposition 4.2. Then ϕ′ is satisfiable in a model with Π02 relations
by our argument above, and from the proof of Proposition 4.2 we directly see that
in fact then also ϕ is satisfiable in a model with Π02 relations.
Finally, if we want our relations to be Σ02, we can take the lim inf of Π
0
1 sets
Ym,i,j instead of the lim sup of Σ
0
1 sets Ym,i,j we took above. 
We will now formalise the ideas discussed above to obtain an analogue of The-
orem 3.3 for regular ε-satisfiability.
Theorem 5.4. Let ϕ be a universal formula in a relational language L. Then the
following are equivalent:
(i) ϕ is ε-satisfiable;
(ii) there exists a finitely additive model (M ,D) such that (M ,D) |=ε ϕ, and such
that for every m ∈ ω and every relation R occurring in ϕ there exists km ∈ ω
and interpretations XMm,i,j ⊆M for 1 ≤ i ≤ km, 1 ≤ j ≤ n which satisfy that
for every function f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} we have that:
(4) (M ,D) |= 1
m
∀x1 . . . ∀xn








Proof. The implication from (i) to (ii) directly follows from Lemma 5.1. For the
converse, we note that (4) can be expressed in the language L ′ which consists of L
enlarged with countably many unary predicate symbols Xm,i,j . Thus, if we have
some finitely additive model satisfying (ii), then by Theorem 3.3 we can find a
weak ε-model (M ′,D ′) which also satisfies (ii). For every m ∈ ω, fix km ∈ ω and
interpretations XM
′































In particular, we see that Z0, Z1, . . . is a Cauchy sequence in the pseudometric
d(X,Y ) = PrDn
[
X4Y ]. Since this metric is complete (see e.g. Bogachev [2, The-
orem 1.12.6]) we can determine a Dn-measurable set ZR to which this sequence
converges.
Now, let ε′ > 0. Fix m such that 1m <
ε′
2 and such that d(Zm, ZR) <
ε′
2 . Then
from (4) it easily follows that
(M ′,D) |=ε′ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ZR(x1, . . . , xn)).
So, from the proof of Terwijn [12, Proposition 3.4] it then follows that
(M ′,D) |=0 ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ZR(x1, . . . , xn)).
Now, if we let N be the model where RN = ZR, then (M ′,D) and (N ,D) ε-satisfy
the same universal formulas by Lemma 5.2. In particular, (N ,D) is an ε-model
which ε-satisfies ϕ. 
Theorem 5.5. Let L be a countable language not containing equality and function
symbols. Then ε-satisfiability is Σ11.
Proof. We only need to consider universal relational formulas by Theorem 4.2.
From Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 5.4 we see that a universal relational formula ϕ is
ε-satisfiable if and only if there is a countable finitely additive model as in (ii) of
Theorem 5.4. However, this last statement can be expressed as a Σ11-formula, in a
similar way as explained in the proof of Theorem 3.6. 
Remark 5.6. As in Remark 3.7, we can actually make finitely additive models as
in Theorem 5.4 (ii) by using a variant of Keisler’s calculus. The extra requirement
(4) corresponds to adding an extra deduction rule with countable infinitely many
hypotheses. We will not go into more detail here, for the reasons explained in the
beginning of section 3.
6. Decidability of 0-satisfiability
In this section we will prove that 0-satisfiability (for languages not containing
equality and function symbols) is not only Σ11, but is in fact decidable. This stands
in stark contrast to the fact that for ε ∈ (0, 1) we have that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-
complete, as will be shown in section 7. It also contrasts the fact that 0-validity
is undecidable: the 0-tautologies are exactly the classical tautologies, as shown in
Terwijn [12].
As in the previous section, we only need to consider universal relational formulas
because of Theorem 4.2. First, we show that 0-satisfiability corresponds to classical
satisfiability in a natural way.
Proposition 6.1. Let m ∈ ω. If a universal relational formula
ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
with n ≤ m has an ε-model (M ,D), and m!(m−n)! (1− (1− ε)n) < 1, then there exists
a finite, classical model N of size m which satisfies
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i<j
xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
classically. In particular, this holds if ε = 0.
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Proof. By Theorem 2.6 we may assume D to be the Lebesgue measure λ. In
particular the diagonals have measure 0. Since (M ,D) |=ε ϕ we therefore have
that, for each injective function f : {1, . . . , n} ↪→ {1, . . . ,m}, the set
Af := {(a1, . . . , am) ∈M n | ai 6= aj for i 6= j and M |= ψ(af(1), . . . , af(n))}












has measure at most m!(m−n)! (1 − (1 − ε)n), which is strictly smaller than 1 by
assumption. So, we see that B has positive measure. In particular B is non-empty,
so choose any (a1, . . . , am) ∈ B. Then M restricted to {a1, . . . , am} classically
satisfies ϕ˜: indeed, if b1, . . . , bn ∈ {a1, . . . , am} are distinct elements, and we let f
be the function sending each 1 ≤ i ≤ n to the unique 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that bi = aj ,
then (a1, . . . , am) ∈ Af implies that M |= ψ(b1, . . . , bn). 
We would also like to have a converse to this proposition, i.e. we would like to
know if there exists anm ∈ ω such that if ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i<j xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
has a finite classical model of size m, then ϕ also has a 0-model. It turns out that
we can do this if we choose m big enough, by using Ramsey’s theorem. In fact,
the way we will use Ramsey’s theorem is very similar to the original use of this
theorem by Ramsey in [10], where Ramsey proved his combinatorial theorem in
order to prove that the variant of the Entscheidungsproblem asking if a universal
relational formula has an infinite model is decidable. First, we need a definition.
Definition 6.2. Let M be a first-order model, let X ⊆ M and let < be a linear
ordering of X. Then we call (X,<) a sequence of indiscernibles if for every n ∈
ω and all sequences a1 < a2 < · · · < an, b1 < b2 < · · · < bn both in X we
have for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) that M |= ϕ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if M |=
ϕ(b1, . . . , bn).
Theorem 6.3. (Ramsey [10, page 279]) Let ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) be a uni-
versal formula not containing function and constant symbols. Let M be a classical
model of size n which satisfies ϕ and for which there exists a linear order < on
M which turns (M , <) into a sequence of indiscernibles. Let (X,≺) be any lin-
early ordered set. Then there exists a model N for ϕ on X which has (X,≺) as a
sequence of indiscernibles.4
Corollary 6.4. If for a propositional relational formula ψ the formula
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i<j
xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
has a model M of size n for which there exists a linear order < on M which turns
(M , <) into a sequence of indiscernibles, then
ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
has a 0-model.
4This is not entirely the way in which Ramsey formulated his theorem, but in fact his proof
directly yields us the result we stated here.
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Proof. By the previous theorem, there exists a model on [0, 1] satisfying ϕ˜ which
has ([0, 1], <) (where < is the usual ordering on [0, 1]) as a sequence of indiscern-
ibles. Because the diagonal has Lebesgue-measure 0, we then directly see that also
(N , λ) |=0 ϕ. The only thing we still need to verify is that (N , λ) is a 0-model.
By Proposition 2.7 it is enough to prove that the relations RN are Borel. Because
([0, 1], <) is a sequence of indiscernibles we have for every relation R of arity k:
RN =
⋃{{(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1]k | ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ k(ai < aj ↔ f(i) < f(j))}
| f : {1, . . . , k} → {1, . . . , k} and RM (bf(1), . . . , bf(k))
}
.
Then RN is equal to a finite union of sets of the form
{(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ [0, 1]k | ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ k(ai < aj ↔ f(i) < f(j))}
which are Borel because the ordering < on [0, 1] is Borel. So, RN is Borel, as
desired. 
The following result follows from the finite Ramsey theorem, together with the
fact that there are computable upper bounds for the Ramsey numbers.
Theorem 6.5. (Ramsey [10, page 279]) There exists a computable f : ω3 → ω such
that for every universal relational formula ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) containing
k relation symbols of arity at most m, if ϕ has a classical model of size at least
f(n, k,m), then it also has a model containing a sequence of indiscernibles of size
n.
Putting all things together, we obtain:
Theorem 6.6. There exists a computable function f : Form → ω such that for
every universal relational formula ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) the following are
equivalent:
(i) ϕ is 0-satisfiable;
(ii) ϕ is ε-satisfiable for some ε ∈ [0, 1] satisfying f(ϕ)!(f(ϕ)−n)! (1− (1− ε)k) < 1;
(iii) ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
∧
i<j(xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn)) has a classical model of size
f(ϕ);
(iv) ϕ˜ has a classical model containing a sequence of indiscernibles of size n.
Proof. Let f˜ be the computable function from Proposition 6.5; this function directly
induces a computable function f : Form→ ω. We prove the equivalences.
(i) → (ii): This is directly clear.
(ii) → (iii): This follows from Proposition 6.1.
(iii) → (iv): This was shown in Theorem 6.5.
(iv) → (i): Finally, this was shown in Corollary 6.4. 
In particular, we see:
Theorem 6.7. 0-satisfiability is decidable for languages not containing equality
and function symbols.
Proof. By Theorem 4.2, we only need to consider universal relational formulas ϕ.
Let f be the computable function as in Theorem 6.6. If we want to check if ϕ is
0-satisfiable, then by Theorem 6.6 (iii) we only need to check if
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
∧
i<j
(xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn))
has a classical model of size f(ϕ), which is a decidable property. 
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There is another interesting fact which follows from Theorem 6.6: the equivalence
of (ii) and (i) says that a formula ϕ which is ε-satisfiable for small enough ε > 0 is in
fact also 0-satisfiable. Thus, one can see 0-satisfiability as the limit of ε-satisfiability
for ε > 0, in the sense given below.
Corollary 6.8.
⋂
ε>0 ε-SAT = 0-SAT.
Proof. From Theorem 6.6. 
Note that we cannot have in general that
⋂
ε′>ε ε
′-SAT = ε-SAT. Namely, in
that case, one could prove using Lemma 5.1 that a universal relational sentence
ϕ is ε-satisfiable if and only if it has a finite ε′-model for every rational ε′ > ε.
However, the latter can be expressed as a first-order arithmetical sentence, while
the universal relational fragment of ε-satisfiability will be shown to be Σ11-hard in
Theorem 7.13.
7. ε-satisfiability Is Σ11-Hard
In this section we will show that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard for rational ε ∈ (0, 1).
Together with the result from section 5 this will show that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-
complete. We will prove this hardness step by step, interpreting more and more
of arithmetic within ε-logic as we go. As a first step, we will look at sentences of
the form ∃Qϕ(Q) in the language of arithmetic (that is, the language consisting of
S,+, ·, 0 and =) where ϕ is universal, in the sense the only quantifiers occurring
in ϕ are first-order universal quantifiers. Equivalently, we can see ϕ(Q) as a first-
order universal sentence in ϕ in the language of arithmetic enlarged with a unary
predicate Q, and ∃Qϕ(Q) is satisfiable in second-order arithmetic if and only if ϕ
is satisfiable in first-order arithmetic (i.e. there exists some interpretation QN such
that N |= ϕ under this interpretation for Q). We will implicitly use this equivalence
throughout this section.
Furthermore, to optimise our result and show that we do not need function or
constant symbols in our language to prove hardness (i.e. to show that the relational
fragment is already Σ11-hard), we will not look at S,+, · and 0 as functions or
constants, but instead as relations S(x) = y, x + y = z, x · y = z and 0 = x. It is
easy to see that any universal sentence ϕ in the language with functions S,+, · and
0 can be transformed into a universal sentence in the language with relations for
S,+, · and 0. Henceforth, when we talk about the language of arithmetic, we will
mean the language with relation symbols for S,+, ·, 0 and =.
Definition 7.1. The language of arithmetic is the language consisting of relation
symbols S(x) = y, x + y = z, x · y = z, 0 = x and x = y. For a formula ϕ in the
language of arithmetic, we say that N |= ϕ if ϕ holds in the natural numbers ω
together with the usual interpretations for S,+, ·, 0 and =.
To formulate the first step in our interpretation, we need a few more tools.
Definition 7.2. Let ϕ be a formula in prenex normal form andN a unary predicate.
Then ϕN , or ϕ relativised to N , is defined as the formula where each ∀xψ(x) is
replaced by ∀x(N(x)→ ψ(x)) and each ∃xψ(x) is replaced by ∃x(N(x) ∧ ψ(x)).
Definition 7.3. Let ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be a propositional formula. Then we denote by
ψ#(x1, . . . , xn) the formula ∧
f :{1,...,n}→{1,...,n}
ψ(xf(1), . . . , xf(n)).
If ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn) with ψ a propositional formula, then we denote by
ϕ# the formula ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ#(x1, . . . , xn).
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Note that for every universal sentence ϕ, if M |= ϕ holds classically, then also
M |= ϕ#. It is the following converse which we will need.
Lemma 7.4. For every propositional formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn) and every countable
model M : if there exists an enumeration {a0, a1, . . . } of M such that for all in-
jective functions pi : {1, . . . , n} ↪→ ω we have M |= ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n)), then
M |= ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn).
Proof. To derive a contradiction, assume M 6|= ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn). Let
ai1 , . . . , ain ∈ M (not necessarily distinct) be such that M 6|= ψ(ai1 , . . . , ain).
Fix a subset A ⊆ ω of size n such that {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ A and fix a bijection
pi : {1, . . . , n} → A. Finally, let f : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} be the function map-
ping 1 ≤ j ≤ n to pi−1(ij). Then ij = pi(f(j)) so M 6|= ψ(api(f(1)), . . . , api(f(n))).
Therefore M 6|= ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n)), a contradiction. 
Proposition 7.5. Let L be a relational language. Let ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
be a universal formula in the language L and let (M ,D) |=0 ϕ#. Then there exists
a countable submodel N ⊆M such that N |= ϕ classically. In fact, for Dω-almost
all (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈M ω we have that M  {a0, a1, . . . } |= ϕ classically.
Proof. For each injective function pi : {1, . . . , n} ↪→ ω, the set
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈M ω | (M ,D) |=0 ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n))}
is measurable (by Proposition 2.3). Furthermore, one can easily see that it in fact
has measure 1, by using Fubini’s theorem and the fact that (M ,D) |=0 ϕ#; for this





{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈M ω | (M ,D) |=0 ψ#(api(1), . . . , api(n))}
is a countable intersection of sets of measure 1, and therefore has measure 1 itself.
From Lemma 7.4 we know that for every (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B we have that ϕ holds
classically in M  {a0, a1, . . . }, which completes our proof. 
Theorem 7.6. Let L be the language consisting of unary relation symbols 0 = x
and N(x) (which will represent our set of natural numbers), binary relation symbols
S(x) = y, x = y,5 x < y, x ≺ y (which will represent x < S(y)) and R(x, y)6,
ternary relation symbols x + y = z and x · y = z, and a unary relation symbol
Q. Furthermore, let f0 be the reduction from 0-satisfiability to
1
2 -satisfiability from




be similar reductions for 14 - and
3
4 -satisfiability.






in the language L, containing
only universal sentences, such that for every first-order universal sentence ϕ in the
language of arithmetic enlarged with Q,7 the following are equivalent:
(i) f0((
∧
















(ii) N |= ∃Qϕ(Q).
5Here we do not mean true equality, but rather a binary relation that we will use to represent
equality.
6The intended interpretation of R(x, y) is quite technical. It is best to think of our model
M as consisting of two copies of ω: one living inside N , one living outside N . However, all the
operations will only be defined on the elements of N ; there is no extra structure on M \ NM .
Our relation R will then be a subset of NM × (M \NM ); the intended interpretation is then that
R(a, b) holds if a ∈ NM , b ∈ M \NM and b 6= S(a).
7Remember, as defined above this is the language consisting of (relation symbols for)
S,+, ·, 0,= and Q.
8Strictly speaking, (
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )# is undefined because it is not in prenex normal form. To
avoid the problem that prenex normal forms are not unique, we assume it has been transformed
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Proof. For T0 we take the universal axioms of Robinson’s Q relativised to N , axioms
specifying that our relations only hold on N , axioms for < and ≺, and some special
axioms for N and R. Some of the axioms will turn out to be redundant, but we
have added them anyway so that all axioms of Robinson’s Q are in T0. The reason
we only add the universal axioms and we avoid the axioms involving existential
quantifiers is that, while we can say that something exists (using the ∃ quantifier),
we cannot say that something holds with strictly positive measure. Our relation R
is meant as a trick to work around this problem.
Thus, we will add the following axioms to T0.
All equality axioms. For example:
∀x(x = x)
∀x∀y((N(x) ∧ x = y)→ N(y))
We should guarantee that 0 is in N :
∀x(0 = x→ N(x))
We now give the axioms for the successor function:
∀x∀y(S(x) = y → N(x) ∧N(y))
(∀x∀y¬(S(x) = y ∧ 0 = y))N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v((S(x) = u ∧ S(y) = v)→ (x = y ↔ u = v)))N
We proceed with the inductive definitions of + and ·:
(∀x∀y∀z(x+ y = z → (N(x) ∧N(y) ∧N(z))))
(∀x∀y∀z(0 = y → (x+ y = z ↔ x = z)))N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v∀w((S(y) = u ∧ x+ y = w)→ (x+ u = v ↔ S(w) = v)))N
(∀x∀y∀z(x · y = z → (N(x) ∧N(y) ∧N(z))))N
(∀x∀y∀z(0 = y → (x · y = z ↔ 0 = z)))N
(∀x∀y∀u∀v∀w((S(y) = u ∧ x · y = w)→ (x · u = v ↔ w + x = v)))N .
into prenex normal form using some fixed algorithm (for example, the algorithm arising from the
proof of Proposition 2.8).
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Normally, we would be able to use an existential quantifier and the other relations
to define x < y and x ≺ y (the latter standing for S(x) < y). However, because we
are trying to avoid the existential quantifier in order to make the proof work, we
give axioms for < and ≺ which we need in our proof. It is easy to see that these
axioms are sound. Because our formula ϕ does not contain < or ≺, it is irrelevant
if they completely define < and ≺ or not, so we only add those axioms which we
need in our proof.
∀x∀y(x < y → N(x) ∧N(y))
∀x∀y(x ≺ y → N(x) ∧N(y))
(∀x∀y¬(S(x) = y ∧ x ≺ y))N
(∀x∀y(x < y ↔ (x ≺ y ∨ S(x) = y)))N
(∀x∀y¬(0 = y ∧ x < y))N
(∀x∀y(0 = x ∨ (0 = y → y < x)))N
(∀x∀y∀z(S(x) = z → (x ≺ y ↔ z < y)))N
Finally, we introduce a predicate R, with axioms which use < and ≺. This predicate
is meant to function as a sort of ‘padding’. The goal of this predicate is to force
the measure of {x | x = S(y)} to be exactly half of {x | x > y}. Since we will also
add an axiom saying that the set of points equal to 0 has measure 14 , this means
the set of points equal to Sn(0) will have measure 2−n−2. We will use this to show
that the collection of ‘standard submodels’ of M has measure 1. The intended
interpretation was described above. First, we want the second coordinate of R to
only hold outside of N .
∀x∀y(R(x, y)→ ¬N(y))
The next axioms for R will be in T 1
2
instead of in T0, because these need to be
evaluated for ε = 12 while the rest will be evaluated for ε = 0. So, this means
in these axioms the universal quantifier will mean “for measure at least 12 many”
instead of the interpretation “for almost all” in T0.
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y(R(x, y) ∨ S(x) = y))
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y¬(R(x, y) ∨ S(x) = y))
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y(R(x, y) ∨ x ≺ y))
∀x(N(x) ∧ ∀y¬(R(x, y) ∨ x ≺ y)).
We also add axioms to T 1
2
to make sure that N has measure 12 :
∀xN(x)
∀x¬N(x).




to ensure that the points
equal to 0 together have measure 14 :
(∀x(0 = x))N
(∀x¬(0 = x))N
We will now show that these axioms indeed do what we promised.
(ii) → (i): Assume N |= ∃Qϕ(Q). Let QN witness this fact. Now take the model
M := ω × {0, 1} to be the disjoint union of two copies of ω, where we define
S,+, ·,≤,≺, 0 on the first copy ω×{0} of ω as in N (remembering that x ≺ y should
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mean S(x) < y) and let them be false elsewhere. For example, (a, 0)+(b, 0) = (c, 0)
holds if and only if a+ b = c, and it is false in all other cases. Let QM ((a, 0)) hold
if QN(a) holds and let it be false elsewhere. Let
N = ω × {0} and R = {((a, 0), (b, 1)) | b 6= S(a)} .
Finally, define D by
D(a, 0) = D(a, 1) := 1
2a+2
.






because all formulas in T0 even hold classically in M .
Furthermore, N clearly has measure 12 and the points equal to 0 = (a0) have













y ∈M | (M ,D) |= 1
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y ∈M | (M ,D) |= 1
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Thus, we also see that the axioms expressing that these two sets have measure 12





. But then we see from Remark 2.14 that there is
a 12 -model (N ,E) such that






















i.e. that (i) holds.
(i)→ (ii): Assume (i) holds. Then, by Remark 2.14 there exists a probability model









and (M ,D) |=0 (
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )#.
By Proposition 7.5 we have that the set
B = {(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈M ω |M  {a0, a1, . . . } |=
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN}
hasDω-measure 1. In particular, because all universal Robinson axioms are in T0 we
see that for every (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B these universal Robinson axioms hold classically
in M 
(
{a0, a1, . . . } ∩NM
)
. The only problem is that we do not know if the two
missing non-universal axioms ∀x(0 = x∨∃yS(y) = x) and ∀x∃yS(x) = y also hold.
However, if we were able to find a subsequence (b0, b1, . . . ) of a permutation of some
(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B satisfying 0 = b0 and S(ai) = ai+1 for all i ∈ ω, these two axioms
would also hold in M  ({b0, b1, . . . }). Furthermore, note that T0 guarantees that
{b0, b1, . . . } ⊆ NM , so we then have that M  {b0, b1, . . . } models all the Robinson
axioms. Even stronger: we have that this model is a model isomorphic to N in which
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ϕ holds (note that ϕ is universal, so it holds in any submodel of M  {a0, a1, . . . }),
showing that (ii) holds. The rest of the proof will therefore consist of showing that
we can find such a sequence in B.
First, we restrict to a subset B′′ of B which still has measure 1. For every
sentence α ∈ T0, say ∀x1 . . . ∀xtβ(x1, . . . , xt) (so t ≤ 3), let α˜(y1, y2) be the formula
∀xtβ(y1, . . . , yt−1, xt). Then
B′ := B ∩
⋂
pi:{1,2}↪→ω




is still a set of measure 1: it is an intersection of measurable sets by Proposition 2.3
and all of these sets have measure 1 because (M ,D) |=0 (
∧
T0 ∧ ϕN )#. We make
one more restriction. Let X be the set{
x ∈M |M |= ¬N(x)}∪{
x ∈ NM | Pr
D
[
y ∈M | R(x, y) ∨ S(x) = y] = Pr
D
[




Then X has measure 1: the union above is disjoint, ¬N has measure exactly 12
and by the axioms for R it follows that the second set has measure 12 . Now let
B′′ = B′ ∩ Xω. Then our axioms hold inside B′′ in a strong sense (that is, the
axioms of T0 hold classically and the axioms about R hold classically in the first
coordinate), which is a fact we will use shortly.
For each n ∈ ω, let Dn be the set⋃
(m0,...,mn)∈ωn+1
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B′′ | 0 = am0 , S(am0) = am1 , . . . , S(amn−1) = amn}.
Then D0 ⊇ D1 ⊇ . . . . By Lemma 7.7 below, each Dn has measure 1. Therefore,⋂
n∈ωDn has measure 1 and in particular it is non-empty. Let (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈⋂
n∈ωDn. For each n ∈ ω, fix an αn such that
∃i0, . . . , in−1(0 = a0 ∧ · · · ∧ S(ain−2) = ain−1 ∧ S(ain−1) = aαn),
which exists because (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ Dn. Now let (b0, b1, . . . ) be the sequence
(aα0 , aα1 , . . . ). Then 0 = b0. Also, we claim that S(b0) = b1. We know that there
exists some i0 such that ai0 = 0 and S(ai0) = b1. Now, because M  {a0, a1, . . . } |=∧
T0 classically, we know in particular that the equality axioms hold classically in
this model. Thus, ai0 = b0 and S(b0) = b1, as desired. In the same way, we can
show that S(bi) = bi+1 holds for any i ∈ ω. Therefore, as discussed above the
model M  {b0, b1, . . . } is isomorphic to N and ϕ(Q) holds in it, which shows that
(ii) holds. 





Proof. Fix n ∈ ω. For k, i ∈ ω with 0 ≤ i < k, denote by Di,kn the set
{(a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B′′ | 0 = ai ∧ S(ai) = ai+k ∧ · · · ∧ S(ai+(n−1)k) = ai+nk}.
Then Di,kn ⊆ Dn. From (M ,D) |= 14 T 14 and (M ,D) |= 34 T 34 we see that PrD
[
a ∈



















2 − 1 > 0. Clearly, for i 6= j the sets Di,kn and Dj,kn are







= 1− (1− 1
2cn
)k.
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)k = 1. 
Lemma 7.8. Let B′′ be as in the proof of Theorem 7.6. Let (a0, . . . , an) ∈M n be




























a ∈M |M |= a0 ≺ a
]
(where we use that R only holds outside N while S and ≺ only hold inside N , so



















a ∈M |M |= a0 < a
]
.
(For this, we use the definition of B′ together with the axiom (∀x∀y(x < y ↔ (x ≺


















a ∈M |M |= S(a0) = a
]




















a ∈M |M |= an+1 ≺ a
]
.




a ∈M |M |= an+1 < a
]
.




a ∈M |M |= an ≺ a
]
,















Next, we turn to the language of arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols
representing finitely many primitive recursive functions — say g1, . . . , gn. So, for
each of these primitive recursive function gi(x1, . . . , xmi) we add a relation sym-
bol gi(x1, . . . , xmi) = y to our language which represents this function. We next
show that Theorem 7.6 still holds if we add these finitely many primitive recursive
functions to our language.
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taining only universal relational sentences, such that for each universal first-order
sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols Q, g1, . . . , gn,
the following are equivalent:
(i) f0((
∧















(ii) N |= ∃Qϕ(Q).







as in the proof of that theorem and we extend T0 with axioms for every gi.
So, let 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Fix any sequence h0, . . . , hk of primitive recursive functions
in such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, either:
• hj = 0, hj = S, or hj is a projection.
• hj is the composition of hs with ht1 , . . . , htm for some 1 ≤ s, t1, . . . , tm < j.
• hj is defined by primitive recursion from hs and ht for some 1 ≤ s, t < j.
• hk = gi.
We add axioms to define each such hj . It is clear what we need to do in the first
case. If hj(x1, . . . , xm) is the composition of hs with ht1 , . . . , htm , we take the
relativisation to N of the universal closure of
(ht1(x1, . . . , xn) = z1 ∧ · · · ∧ htm(x1, . . . , xn) = zm)
→ (hj(x1, . . . , xm) = y ↔ hs(z1, . . . , zm) = y).
Similarly, if hj is defined by primitive recursion over hs and ht, then we take the
relativisation to N of the universal closure of
0 = x→ (hj(x, y1, . . . , yn) = z ↔ hs(y1, . . . , yn) = z)
and of
(hj(x, y1, . . . , yn) = z ∧ S(x) = u)
→ (ht(x, z, y1, . . . , yn) = v ↔ hj(u, y1, . . . , yn) = v).
This completes our description of the construction of T0.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), we can follow the proof of the previous theorem,
giving every primitive recursive function g is usual interpretation on ω × {0} and
letting it be undefined elsewhere.
Conversely, in our proof that (i) implies (ii), we define B for our new formula∧
T0 ∧ ϕN . It will still have measure 1. Then for any (a0, a1, . . . ) ∈ B, the ax-
ioms given above hold classically in M 
(
{a0, a1, . . . } ∩NM
)
and therefore the
primitive recursive functions hi, so in particular g1, . . . , gn, have their usual or true
interpretation in this restricted model. So, if we perform the construction above
with this new B, then we get a model M  {b0, b1, . . . } in which ϕ holds which
is not just isomorphic to N, but is even isomorphic to N enlarged with the usual
interpretations of g1, . . . , gn. Therefore we still see that (i) implies (ii) even with
the addition of these primitive recursive functions. 
Next, we will want to include relation symbols of the form {e}Q(x1, x2) = y.
Here, {e}Q(x1, x2) = y means that the eth partial computable functional halts with
oracle Q and input x1, x2 and outputs y, or in the notation of the normal form the-
orem for partial computable restricted functionals (see e.g. Odifreddi [9, Theorem
II.3.11]), it means that ∃zT1,2(e, x1, x2, Qˆ(z), z) and U(µz[T1,2(e, x1, x2, Qˆ(z), z)]) =
y.
To this end, we add ternary relation symbols {e}Q(x1, x2) = y to our language
for all e ∈ ω (so, we do not see e or Q as a variable here; we add a relation symbol
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for every e and the Q is purely notational). Using the normal form of partial
computable restricted functionals we can now easily expand our result to include
these functionals.






be as in Theorem 7.6. Then there exists






, containing only universal relational sentences,
and a computable function e 7→ ψe mapping each e ∈ ω to a universal relational
sentence, such that for each universal sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic



















(ii) N |= ∃Q(ϕ), i.e. there exists some QN ⊆ ω such that N |= ϕ if Q is interpreted
as QN and {e}Q(x1, x2) = y is interpreted as {e}QN(x1, x2) = y.
Proof. We let U and T1,2 represent the primitive recursive functions from the normal
form theorem for partial computable restricted functionals, as discussed above.
Furthermore, we let V(x, y) represent the primitive recursive function which outputs
z + 1 if y has length at least x and the xth digit equals z, and which outputs 0
otherwise. Now let the Tε be as in Theorem 7.9, applied to U , T1,2 and V.
We let W(x, y) represent “the sequence x is an approximation to Q up to digit
y”, so we add to T0 the relativisation to N of the universal closure of
(0 = y ∧ 0 = u ∧ S(u) = v ∧ S(v) = w)
→ (W(x, y)↔ ((V(y, x) = v ↔ ¬Q(y)) ∧ (V(y, x) = w ↔ Q(y)))),
and of
(S(z) = y ∧ 0 = u ∧ S(u) = v ∧ S(v) = w)
→ (W(x, y)↔ (W(x, z) ∧ (V(y, x) = v ↔ ¬Q(y)) ∧ (V(y, x) = w ↔ Q(y)))).
Finally, for each e ∈ ω, let ψe be the relativisation to N of the universal closure of
W(u, z) ∧ T1,2(e, x1, x2, u, z)→ ({e}Q(x1, x2) = y ↔ U(z) = y)).
The proof now proceeds in the same way as for Theorem 7.9, observing that our
new axioms ensure that {e}Q gets the right interpretation. 
So, now we have Π01-hardness. To get to Σ
1
1-hardness, we first put the Σ
1
1-
formulas into a more appropriate form.
Lemma 7.11. Let A be the set of those universal (relational) formulas ϕ in the
language of arithmetic enlarged with relation symbols Q, {0}Q, {1}Q, . . . for which
there exists some interpretation QN ⊆ ω satisfying:
• N |= ϕ if Q is interpreted as QN and {e}Q(x1, x2) = y is interpreted as
{e}QN(x1, x2) = y;
• For all n there is some m ∈ QN coding a string of length n.
Then A is Σ11-hard.
Proof. The set of indices of non-well-founded computable trees is Σ11-hard (for ex-
ample, see Odifreddi [9, Corollary IV.2.16]). This set many-one reduces to A : for
every index e ∈ ω, the expression “{e} computes a tree and Q ⊆ {e}” can be
written as a universal formula ϕ(Q) in the language as above. Now {e} computes
a non-well-founded tree if and only if there exists a Q as above, completing our
proof. 
9By {e}Q ∈ ϕ we mean that the relation symbol {e}Q occurs in the formula ϕ.
28 R. KUYPER
So, we need to somehow expand our theories in such a way that it only allows
those Q which contain a string of every possible length. To achieve this, we will
add even more relation symbols to our language, and we will use some of these as
additional oracles. Let A ⊆ ω × X for some set X. We view elements from the
set X as parameters: i.e. for all p ∈ X we will write {e}Q⊕Ap(x1, x2) = y if the
eth partial computable function halts with oracle Q ⊕ {n ∈ ω | (n, p) ∈ A} and
input x1, x2, and outputs y. We will add a binary relation symbol A, a ternary
relation symbol B and a 5-ary relation symbol {e}Q⊕Ap(x1, x2) = y for every e ∈ ω
to our language. Using the same method as in the proof of Theorem 7.10 above,
we will guarantee that for every model (M ,D) satisfying our theory we have for
almost all p ∈ M that our interpretation of {e}Q⊕Ap(x1, x2) = y in the model M
agrees with its true interpretation in N. We will combine this with the construction
used in Kuyper and Terwijn [8] to show that compactness does not hold for ε-logic;
in some sense, compactness failing is the same as forcing infinite objects to exist,
which explains the correlation with our current goal.
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and a computable function e 7→ ψe mapping each e ∈ ω to a universal relational
sentence, such that for each universal sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic


















(ii) ϕ is in the set A of Lemma 7.7.
Proof. We start with the theories Tε and the universal sentences ψe as in Theorem
7.10. We need to expand our theory in such a way that case (i) can only hold if Q
contains a string of length n for every n ∈ ω, using the relation symbols A and B.
For this, we will make use of the construction which was used to show that ε-
logic is not compact in Kuyper and Terwijn [8, Theorem 8.2]. There, sentences
αn were defined such that for any model (M ,D) for some language containing a
binary relation symbols symbol E we have that (M ,D) |= 1
2
αn if and only if we
have that:
For almost all y (i.e. measure 1 many), there exists a set Cy of measure at least
1− 1n such that for all y′ ∈ Cy the sets Dy = {u | E(u, y)} and Dy′ = {u | E(u, y′)}
both have measure 12 , while Dy∩Dy′ has measure 14 (in other words, the two sets are
independent sets of measure 12). In the proof of [8, Theorem 8.2], it was shown that
every finite subset of {α1, α2, . . . } is satisfiable, but no infinite subset is satisfiable.
Fix an index e1 such that {e1}Q(n,m) computes the indicator function of “there
exists some n′ ≤ n such that n′ codes a string of length m and n′ ∈ Q”. Our
idea is to let αn hold, with E interpreted as {(x, y) | B(m,x, y)}, if and only
{e1}Q(n,m) = 0. Then, as discussed above, only finitely many of these αn are
allowed to hold for any fixed m, so we see that there has to be some n ∈ ω such
that {e}Q(n,m) = 1, i.e. Q contains a string of length m. This is precisely what
we want to achieve.
To this end we first need to change the definition of αn from [8] into a more
uniform one. In [8], we have a different formula for every n (which in fact grows
exponentially in n). We wish to change it into one fixed formula α˜ which has n
as a parameter, i.e. we want one formula α˜ such that αn is equivalent to α˜(n) for
every n ∈ ω. This is what we will use A for. If we unfold the first two reductions
in the definition of αn from [8] for n ≥ 2, and rename some of the relation symbols
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∀y′((Yi1(y) ∨ · · · ∨ Yim(y)) ∧ α′(y, y′))
)
where α′ is a formula that does not depend on n. Here, we denoted by Yi(x) the
formula Xi(x) ∧
∧
1≤j≤2,j 6=i ¬Xj(x) for i ∈ {1, 2} and Xi(x) ∧
∧
3≤j≤2n,j 6=i ¬Xj(x)
for i ∈ {3, . . . , 2n}, and the Xi are new predicates.
Because we want to make a more uniform version of this formula, we want to
use the single binary predicate A instead of these predicates Xi and Yi. To this
end, fix an index e2 such that for all oracles Q,C and all binary sequences σ we
have that {e2}Q⊕C(σ, 〈n,m〉) computes the indicator function of
∃i ∈ σ




Next, fix an index e3 such that {e3}Q(σ, n) computes if σ is a subset of {3, . . . , 2n} of
size n−1, and similarly an index e4 which computes if σ is a subset of {3, . . . , 2n} of
size n. Finally, fix an index e5 such that {e5}Q(n,m) computes the pairing function
〈x, y〉. We can now define our uniform version α˜(n,m) of αn:
∀yA(〈〈n,m〉, 1〉, y) ∧ ∀yA(〈〈n,m〉, 2〉, y)







∧ ∀u({e4}Q(u, n)→ ∀y′({e2}Q,Ay′ (u, 〈n,m〉) ∧ α˜′(m, y, y′)))
)
.
Here the formula α˜′(m, y, y′) is the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of
E(x, y) by B(m,x, y) in α′. We freely wrote α(0) for ∀x(N(x)∧(0 = x→ α(x))); we
will interpret this formula for ε = 12 , and because N has measure
1
2 this essentially
means that for almost all x ∈ N we have that 0 = x→ α(x). We did similar things
for 1, for 2 and for the pairing function 〈x, y〉, using the index e5 for the latter.
We now add the following formula to T 1
2
:
∀n∀m(N(n) ∧N(m) ∧ ({e1}Q(n,m) = 0→ α˜(n,m))).
Furthermore, we add ψe to T0 for e ∈ {e1, e3, e4, e5}. Like in the proof of Theorem
7.10, we add an axiom for W ′(x, y, z) specifying that W ′(x, y, z) holds if and only
if the sequence x is an approximation to Q⊕ Az, where Az = {n | (n, z) ∈ A}, up
to digit y. Finally, we add a rule for e2 to T0, namely the universal closure of
W ′(u, z, v) ∧ T1,2(e2, x1, x2, u, z)→ ({e2}Q⊕Av (x1, x2) = y ↔ U(z) = y),
where all quantifiers except the one for v are relativised to N .
We prove that the theories defined above are as desired. First, assume (ii) holds.
We define a model M in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 7.10. However,
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this time we do not take the universe to be two copies of ω, but instead we take our
universe to be the unit interval. We let our measure be the Lebesgue measure. Fix
a partition {U0, U1, . . . } ∪ {V0, V1, . . . } of [0, 1] such that all Un, Vn are measurable
with measure 12n+2 . Looking back at our proof of Theorem 7.10 (and Theorem 7.6),
we identify the elements of each Un with the element n in the first copy of ω and
each Vn with the element n in the second copy of ω. This allows us to define the
relations in the language of arithmetic in the same way as before: for example, we
let x + y = z hold precisely if x ∈ Un, y ∈ Um and z ∈ Un+m for some n,m ∈ ω.
We let N(x) hold if x ∈ Un for some n ∈ ω. With this in mind, it should be clear
from the proof of Theorem 7.10 how to define R and all the other relations already
appearing in the proof of that theorem.
The only relations of which it might not be directly clear how to define them are
A and B. How to define B is explained in the proof of [8, Theorem 8.2], while how
to define A follows from the proof of Theorem 2.12.
For the converse, assume (i) holds. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 7.10, we
can find a model M  {b0, b1, . . . } which is isomorphic to N and a relation Q on
{b0, b1, . . . }, such that {ei}Q, {e2}Q⊕Ap have their usual interpretation and such
that ϕ holds in this model. Using similar ideas as in the proof of that theorem, we
can even assume that our model satisfies our new axioms in the following way:











y ∈M |M |= A(〈〈bn, bm〉, b2〉, y)
] ≥ 1
2








for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, Pr
D
[
y ∈M |M |= A(〈〈bn, bm〉, bi〉, y)




y′ ∈M | (M ,D) |= 1
2







Now one can directly verify (using the proof of Theorem 2.12) that under this
interpretation, α˜(bn, bm) is equivalent to the formula αn with E(x, y) replaced by
{(x, y) | B(m,x, y)}. However, we also have that if Q does not contain a string of
length m, then α˜(bn, bm) holds for all n ∈ ω, which is a contradiction (as explained
above). So, we see that Q contains a string of every length and therefore (ii)
holds. 
Theorem 7.13. For rational ε ∈ (0, 1) we have that ε-satisfiability is Σ11-hard.
Proof. From Lemma 7.7 and Theorem 7.12. 
Theorem 7.14. Let L be a countable language not containing equality and function
symbols and let ε ∈ (0, 1) be rational. Then ε-satisfiability is Σ11-complete.
Proof. The Σ11-hardness was shown in Theorem 7.13, while Theorem 5.5 gives the
matching upper bound. 
COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF SATISFIABILITY IN PROBABILITY LOGIC 31
8. Compactness of 0-logic
We conclude this paper by showing that 0-logic is compact (when considering
languages not containing equality and function symbols), which will quite directly
follow from the results from the previous section. This contrasts the fact that for
rational ε ∈ (0, 1) we have that ε-logic is not compact, as shown in Kuyper and
Terwijn [8, Theorem 8.2].
First, we need the following strengthening of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 8.1. Let L be a language not containing equality and function symbols
(but it may contain constant symbols) and let Γ be a countable set of formulas in L.
Then there exists a language L ′ only containing relation symbols and a computable
function mapping each formula ϕ ∈ Γ in the language L to a universal formula ϕ′
in the language L ′ such that for every ε ∈ [0, 1] and every subset ∆ ⊆ Γ: ∆ is
ε-satisfiable if and only if ∆′ = {ϕ′ | ϕ ∈ ∆} is ε-satisfiable.
Proof. We prove this in almost the same way as Theorem 4.2. We construct ϕ′ as in
that theorem, but instead of using relations Rα to define ϕ
′ we use relations Rα,ϕ.
That is, we introduce new relation symbols for every formula ϕ, instead of reusing
the same ones. There is one exception to this rule: when α = 0 (i.e. the function
which is constantly 0) we always use the relation Rα, which does not depend on ϕ.
Now let ∆ ⊆ Γ. For ease of notation we assume ∆ is infinite, say ∆ =
{ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . }; the finite case follows in the same way. If ∆ is ε-satisfiable, then
one can prove that ∆′ is ε-satisfiable in the same way as in the proof of Theorem
4.2. For the converse we also use a similar proof, but we need to make some slight
modifications. Note that, in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we used the measure 0 Can-
tor set C ⊆ [0, 1] to provide us with witnesses. Now we partition C into countably
many uncountable Borel measure 0 sets. For example, we can take Ci ⊆ C to be
those x ∈ C which correspond to a sequence starting with 0i1. We can then take
Borel isomorphisms ζi : Ci →
⋃
1≤i≤n[0, 1]
i and use ζi to provide the witnesses for
ϕi.
More precisely, we show how to modify the definition of RM in the proof of
Theorem 4.2. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ [0, 1]. If there are 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ k such that
ai1 ∈ Cj1 , ai2 ∈ Cj2 but j1 6= j2, we let RM (a1, . . . , ak) be false (but it does not
really matter how we define RM in this case, as long as we make sure that the
resulting relation is Borel; for example, we could also define it to always be true
in this case). Otherwise, we let r ∈ ω be such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have that
ai ∈ C implies that in fact ai ∈ Cr. Let α(i) = (1, j) if ai ∈ C and ζ(ai) has length j,
let α(i) = (2, j) if ai ∈ ran(η) and η−1(ai) = j and finally let α(i) = 0 if neither of
these cases hold. Let b1, . . . , bk′ be the subsequence of a1, . . . , ak obtained by taking
just those ai satisfying α(ai) = 0. Let m = max{j ∈ ω | (1, j) ∈ ran(α)} and let i
be the least 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that α(j) = (1,m). Now let RM (a1, . . . , ak) be defined
as RNα,ϕr (b1, . . . , bk′ , (ζ
r)1(ai), . . . , (ζ
r)m(ai)). The rest of the proof proceeds in the
same way as for Theorem 4.2. 
Theorem 8.2. For countable languages L not containing equality and function
symbols, 0-logic is compact. That is, if Γ is any (countable) set of sentences such
that any finite subset of Γ is 0-satisfiable, then Γ is 0-satisfiable.
Proof. By Theorem 8.1 we may assume all formulas in Γ to be universal relational
formulas. For every formula ϕ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xnψ(x1, . . . , xn), let
ϕ˜ = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn
∧
i<j
(xi 6= xj → ψ(x1, . . . , xn)).
Let Γ˜ = {ϕ˜ | ϕ ∈ Γ}. We claim: Γ˜ has an infinite classical model.
32 R. KUYPER
By classical compactness, it is enough to show that for every m ∈ ω and every
finite subset ∆˜ ⊆ Γ˜ there is a model for ∆˜ of size at least m. Let ∆ = {ϕ | ϕ˜ ∈ ∆˜}.
Then by assumption we have that
∧
∆ is 0-satisfiable. So, by Proposition 6.1 we
see that
∧˜
∆ has a classical model M of size at least m. However, it is directly
seen that then in fact M |= ∆˜, so M is a classical model for ∆˜ of size at least m.
So, Γ˜ has an infinite classical model. Using the infinite Ramsey Theorem we then
know that Γ˜ has a model on [0, 1] with ([0, 1], <) as a sequence of indiscernibles,
see e.g. Chang and Keisler [3, Theorem 3.3.10]. Because ([0, 1], <) is a sequence
of indiscernibles we can directly see that the relations on this model are Borel
(in a similar way as in the proof of Corollary 6.4), and because the diagonal has
Lebesgue-measure 0 we see that (M , λ) |=0 Γ, as desired. 
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